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In realistic continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols, an eavesdropper may exploit the addi-
tional Gaussian noise generated during transmission to mask her presence. We present a theoretical framework
for a post-selection based protocol which explicitly takes into account excess Gaussian noise. We derive a
quantitative expression of the secret key rates based on the Levitin and Holevo bounds. We experimentally
demonstrate that the post-selection based scheme is still secure against both individual and collective Gaussian
attacks in the presence of this excess noise.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Dv, 89.70.+c
Continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD)
[1] was introduced as an alternative to the original discrete
variable single photon schemes [2]. CV-QKD promises to of-
fer higher secret key rates, better detection efficiencies and
higher bandwidths than its single photon counterpart and is
easily adapted to current communication systems. Currently
the two main protocols in CV-QKD are post-selection (PS) [3]
and reverse reconciliation (RR) [4]. These protocols are based
on the random Gaussian modulation of coherent states using
either homodyne [4] or heterodyne [5] detection and both have
been experimentally demonstrated [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. At present
PS-based CV-QKD has practical advantages in terms of key
distillation and has been demonstrated experimentally for up
to 90% channel loss [7].
Reverse reconciliation CV-QKD, due to its inherent nature,
easily incorporates excess noise into the protocols, and secu-
rity proof have been demonstrated in the case of individual
Gaussian attacks [4, 5], non-Gaussian attacks [11], collec-
tive attacks [12, 13] (with their Gaussian optimality [14]) and
coherent states using homodyne detection [15]. For PS CV-
QKD, the addition of excess noise into the analysis is quite
difficult. The original protocol [3] only considered pure or
vacuum states in its scheme and so far all post-selection pro-
tocols since have concentrated on the unrealistic case of zero
excess noise [7, 16, 17]. Recently however, excess noise using
a hybrid protocol, consisting of both post-selection and either
direct or reverse reconciliation, was considered for the case of
collective attacks [18].
In this paper, we present a protocol for calculating the effect
of excess Gaussian noise (EGN) on post-selection where two
way classical communication is permitted, and show its secu-
rity when considering either individual or collective attacks.
We apply our analysis to an experimental demonstration and
conclude that good key rates can be obtained under the realis-
tic condition of channel with loss and excess Gaussian noise.
We extend the original PS CV-QKD protocol [3] as fol-
lows. The sender, Alice draws two random numbers SxA and
SpA from Gaussian distributions of variances V xA and V
p
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FIG. 1: (color online). Schematic of setup. Quantum channel of
transmission η and excess noise ξ is simulated experimentally (a) and
analyzed theoretically for the entangling cloner attack (b). λ/2: half
waveplate; PBS: polarizing beam-splitter; AM/PM: amplitude/phase
modulators; RNG: independent white noise generators; EPR: Entan-
glement source; Q-mem: quantum memory.
spectively, which she encodes on the amplitude (x) and phase
(p) of a coherent beam. Each encoding (SxA, SpA) represent a
pair of bits whose value is fixed by the sign of the encoding.
The modulated Gaussian beam is then transmitted to the re-
ceiver, Bob, through a lossy and noisy Gaussian channel with
transmission η and variance of EGN ξ. Bob receives a Gaus-
sian mixed state ρˆB with variance V x,pB = ηV
x,p
A +1+ξ, and
then randomly measures either the amplitude mxB or phase
mpB quadratures of this mixed state. As both amplitude and
phase play the same role, we will only explicitly consider one
quadrature for the rest of this paper, and denote Alice’s encod-
ing and Bob’s measurement as SA and mB respectively. The
probability that Bob measures a particular value mB given
that Alice used a particular encoding SA is given by the con-
ditional probability,
p(mB|SA) = e
−(mB−√ηSA)2/(2(1+ξ)VV )√
2pi(1 + ξ)VV
(1)
2where VV is the variance of the vacuum noise. Note that in
this paper the vacuum noise is normalized to VV = 1. The
error rate in Bob deciding whether Alice encoded positively
or negatively is thus given by
Pe =
1
1 + e
2
√
η
|SAmB |
(1+ξ)VV
(2)
The mutual information rate between Alice and Bob is given
as a function of this error probability using the Shannon for-
mula [19] IAB = Φ(1− 2Pe) where
Φ(x) =
1
2
[(1 + x) log2(1 + x) + (1 − x) log2(1− x)] (3)
Bob then informs Alice over a public channel which quadra-
ture he measured and at what time interval. Alice and Bob
then both announce the absolute values of their encodings
|SA| and measurement results |mB| respectively. This is in
contrast to previous zero excess noise protocols where only
Alice announces her absolute value [3, 7]. Alice and Bob then
post-select information for which they have a mutual infor-
mation advantage over Eve and discard information for which
they do not. Alice and Bob also choose a random subset of
data to characterize the channel loss η, the EGN ξ and check
that the statistics are Gaussian. Finally Alice and Bob use a
two way reconciliation algorithm to reconcile their data.
As with any type of eavesdropping attack, we assume any
EGN on the quantum channel is always attributed to, and con-
trolled by, the eavesdropper, Eve. The fact that there exists ex-
cess noise on the channel allows Eve to be entangled to Bob.
There exists a known upper bound ξ < 2η [16] to the amount
of EGN ξ that can be added on a channel of transmission η
above which Alice and Bob’s quantum correlation cease to
exist [4]. We consider here the entangling cloner attack which
has been shown optimal for PS CVQKD with collective at-
tacks in the presence of EGN [18]. The entangling cloner at-
tack (see Fig. 1 (b)) consists of Eve replacing the lossy line
by a beam splitter of transmission η where one of the inputs is
Alice’s initial state in a quadrature basis given by
|ψA〉 = (2pi)−1/4
∫
dx1e
− 14 (x1−SA)2 |x1〉 (4)
and the second input is one arm of an entangled state Eve has
created given by
|ψEPR〉 = 1√
2pi
∫∫
dx2dx3e
1
4 (−Vsx22−x23/Vs)
∣∣∣∣ 1√2(x2+x3)
〉 ∣∣∣∣ 1√2(x2−x3)
〉
(5)
where 1/2 (Vs + 1/Vs) = (1− η + ξ) /(1−η) is the variance
of the entangled beam she injects to simulate the EGN ξ. Eve
keeps one of the entangled beams (denoted E1) and one of
the outputs of the beam splitter (denoted E2) while she sends
the remaining output to Bob (denoted B) through a perfect
noiseless and lossless line. When Bob performs his homodyne
measurement and announces its absolute value |mB|, Eve’s
state collapses to one of the four possible pure state given by
|ψab 〉E1,E2 , where the superscript a = 0, 1 refers to Alice’s
encoded bit and the subscript b=0, 1 to Bob’s measured bit.
|ψab 〉E1,E2 =
1
√
η(2pi)
3
4
∫∫
dx2dx3
e
− 14
h
((−1)b |mB |√
η
−(−1)a|SA|−
q
1−η
2η (x3−x2))2+x22Vs+x23/Vs
i
∣∣∣∣−(−1)b
√
1− η
η
|mB| −
√
1
2η
(x2 − x3)
〉
E2∣∣∣∣ 1√2(x2 + x3)
〉
E1
(6)
Note that this state is not normalised, 〈ψ|ψ〉 = pmB|SA given
by Eq. (1). The amount of secure bits that Alice and Bob
can extract for each transmission is given by max{0, IAB−
max{IAE , IBE}}. Eve chooses to maximise her information
with either Alice or Bob depending on which will give her
the greater information. If Eve decides to attack Alice, she
needs to distinguish between the states ρaAE = |ψa0 〉 〈ψa0 |+
|ψa1 〉 〈ψa1 |. To attack Bob, she needs to distinguish between
the states ρbBE=
∣∣ψ0b〉 〈ψ0b ∣∣+∣∣ψ1b〉 〈ψ1b ∣∣.
The inner products between these states can be computed
explicitly by performing the Gaussian integrations in Eq. (6).
For example, the four terms that distinguishes Eve’s input for
attacking Alice from her inputs for attacking Bob are:
〈
ψ00 |ψ10
〉
=
〈
ψ11 |ψ01
〉
=
exp
[
−m2B+(1+ξ)S2A2(1+ξ)
]
√
2pi(1 + ξ)
(7)
〈
ψ00 |ψ01
〉
=
〈
ψ11 |ψ10
〉
=
exp
[
− (1+ξ)2m2B+ηS2A2(1+ξ)
]
√
2pi(1 + ξ)
(8)
We see that at the critical value of mcB =
√
1+ξ−η
(1+ξ)2−1SA, all
the above inner products are equal. Eve’s input state for at-
tacking Alice is unitarily equivalent to that for attacking Bob,
and hence her accessible information with Alice is exactly the
same as with Bob: IAE = IBE . WhenmB > mcB , Eve would
gain more information by attacking Bob while below this line
she stands to gain more by attacking Alice.
Given Eve’s two input states, we need to find her accessible
information. If this is smaller than IAB , Alice and Bob keep
the bit and distill a key from it. Our task now is to find Eve’s
accessible information for such states. We bound this infor-
mation from above for both individual and collective attacks.
A bound on Eve’s accessible information I(i)E in the case
of individual attacks is calculated by providing her with the
knowledge on whether Alice and Bob’s bit values match or
not. With this information, Eve’s input is reduced to two pure
states. Her accessible information is bounded by
I
(i)
E = p1Φ
(√
1− f21
)
+ p2Φ
(√
1− f22
)
(9)
3where p1 is the probability that Alice and Bob obtains the
same bits and p2 is the probability that their bits differ, and
f1 =
〈
ψ00 |ψ11
〉
〈ψ00 |ψ00〉
andf2 =
〈
ψ01 |ψ10
〉
〈ψ01 |ψ01〉
, (10)
are the normalised inner products between the states that Eve
distinguishes [20]. We note that this bound corresponds to the
Levitin bound as given in [3] for the case of no added noise.
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FIG. 2: (color online). Post-selection regions at η=0.5 are shown in
red. Figures (a) and (b) show the information rates ∆I = IAB−IE
with no excess noise for individual and collective attacks. Figures (c)
and (d) is when ξ=0.2. On the dashed line mcB in figure (c), Eve can
obtain the same amount of information from Alice as she can from
Bob. The post-selection region asymptotes to the lines ml±
B
.
We apply Holevo’s theorem [21] on Eve’s input states, ρE ,
to bound Eve’s information in terms of the von Neumann en-
tropy, S(ρ), and obtain the amount of information I(c)E acces-
sible by Eve when performin collective attacks
I
(c)
E = S(ρ
0
E + ρ
1
E)− S(2ρ0E)/2− S(2ρ1E)/2 (11)
Figure (2) shows the difference in mutual information from
Bob’s point of view when Alice announces SA for a fixed
value of η and ξ. For each η and ξ, Alice then chooses the
value of V optA such that the weighted integral over the positive
information region Ω given below is maximised.
∆I(i,c) =
∫
Ω
p(SA,mB)(IAB − I(i,c)E )dmBdSA (12)
In principle, as long as the post-selection region is non-
empty, Alice and Bob can always distill a finite amount of
key. At a certain noise threshold however, we expect that there
will be no more post-selectable region. This is clear for ξ=2 η
[16], since then the state between Alice and Bob becomes sep-
arable. In this case, Eve can do an intercept and resend attack
in which IE > IAB for all values of SA and mB .
But even before the separability limit is reached, the post-
selectable region may become empty. To analyse this, we
consider the case when SA is large. In such a case, Alice
and Bob would share the same bits with a high probability.
Eve’s accessible information then tends to Φ
(√
1− f21
)
. In
this limit, Eve’s input becomes ever closer to being just two
classical pure states and so Holevo’s bound would tend to the
same limiting information. Equating this with IAB , we obtain
two solutions for ml±B :
ml±B =
√
η(1+ξ)±
√
η(1+ξ)2−ξ(ξ+2)(ξ+1−η)
ξ(2+ξ)
SA. (13)
In other words, the region of post-selectibility asymptotes to
these two lines as SA increases (see Fig. 2). The noise thresh-
old ξ0 over which the quantum channel is insecure is ob-
tained when the two lines ml+B and m
l−
B coincide such that
there is no more region of post-selectibility. This occurs when
η(1 + ξ0)
2 = ξ0(ξ0 + 2)(ξ0 + 1− η).
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FIG. 3: (color online). Experimental results superimposed on theo-
retical lower bounds of secure key rates at transmission η = 0.47 ±
0.002 when Eve does a collective attack and an individual attack
(inset). Unfilled data points with arrows have error bars going to
negative ∆I . The shaded region indicates the noise threshold for se-
cure keys. The experimental results were obtained using an encoding
variance optimized for the individual attack bound.
Fig. 1(a) shows the schematic of our experiment. In this
setup we encoded keys on the amplitude quadrature and sim-
ulated the loss of the line by using a variable attenuator and
4the added noise by adding a random Gaussian signal onto the
amplitude quadrature on Alice’s amplitude modulator. The
transmitted light is detected using a homodyne detection setup
at Bob’s station. The two sets of time series, Alice’s encoding
SA and Bob’s measurementmB were analysed using the tools
developed in [7]. We note that extraction of the final key can
be performed using the methods described in [7] with an av-
erage efficiency of 2 to 4 % for all datasets with positive raw
information rates ∆I .
Figure 3 shows experimental results superimposed onto
theoretical bounds of total post-selected information rates
∆I = IAB − IE at channel transmission η = 47% for indi-
vidual and collective attacks, as a function of channel EGN ξ.
The experimental mutual information rate between Alice and
Bob IAB is calculated by comparing the two signal-processed
time series SxA and mxB . This quantity is less than the theoret-
ical calculation due to experimental imperfections associated
with the encoding (e.g. non-optimum encoding variance), de-
tection (e.g. homodyne inefficiency) and signal processing.
Experimental uncertainty is calculated for IAB due to the fi-
nite number of data points. The information rate for Eve IE is
calculated theoretically, with error bars in IE calculated using
the uncertainties in channel transmission, EGN and Alice’s
variance VA.
The experimental data points ∆Iexp are in good agreement
with the theoretical results. For some of the higher EGN cases,
the error bars extend towards the negative region. It should be
emphasized however, that this is mainly due to the finite num-
ber of collected data that results in statistical uncertainties. In
our experiment, 2.4MBits of data were taken per run. The
theoretical curves for ∆I in Fig. 3 monotonically decreases
until they reach exactly zero at the security threshold line. No
secure keys can be generated in the shaded region.
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FIG. 4: (color online). Experimental results superimposed on theo-
retical contour plots of information rate after post-selection (∆I) as a
function of channel transmission η and EGN ξ. (a),(b),(c),(d),(e) in-
dicates ∆I = 10−1, 10−2, 10−3, 10−4, 10−7. Filled (unfilled) data
points indicate ∆Iexp > 0 (∆Iexp ≤ 0). No secure keys can be
generated in the shaded regions. Dark shade indicates separability
between Alice’s and Bob’s states.
Fig. 4 shows the experimental results superimposed on con-
tour plots of ∆I as a function of η and ξ. Three sets of ex-
perimental runs were taken for η ≈ 0.2, 0.5, 0.8. Filled and
unfilled data points indicate ∆Iexp>0 and ∆Iexp≤0 respec-
tively. We obtained positive information rates for η=0.2 for
ξ = 0.1. In principle, lower η is attainable; the experimental
demonstration for such cases is left for future work.
In conclusion, we have extended the original post-selection
protocol [3] to take into account the effect of channel EGN for
individual and collective Gaussian attacks by an eavesdropper.
In both cases, we find that the scheme is still secure. We have
also presented an experimental demonstration, which verifies
for the first time that continuous variable quantum cryptogra-
phy using post-selection is secure in the presence of channel
loss as well as EGN. This is important since realistic laser
sources and optical fibers [8] inevitably inherit EGN. Reana-
lyzing our results from [7] using the theory presented in this
paper we conclude that the small amount of EGN present in
that experiment would have had negligible effect on the key
rates if properly accounted for.
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